This paper offers a critical review of seven indices of rule of law. Based on a coherent framework, the comparative evaluation addresses some of the most crucial aspects of measures, namely their focus and scope, conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation.
The justification of choices made in relation to the index constructions are often inadequate, and among the particular shortcomings are severe limitations in the years covered, conceptual redundancy, limitations in the construction and availability of disaggregate data, insufficient codebooks, and missing grounding of aggregation in theory and tests of empirical dimensionality. The rule of law measures are found to tap into at least two distinct dimensions; one of them tends to reflect the quality of the legal system (e.g., equality before the law and independent courts) and the other mirrors the level of order in society (e.g., absence of violence and crime). Finally, the results from a multiple-regression analysis with rule of law as the dependent variable change in significant ways if one of the measures is replaced with another. Taken together, the findings suggest that more precaution is needed in the development and application of rule of law indicators.
Monitoring good governance is advanced by the development of measures helping us to track differences across space and time. Such efforts, however, only signify a step forward if the development is not followed by an inclination of paying only little attention to the quality of the data; thus risking uncritical use of measures highly suspect in terms of their reliability, validity, and equivalence (Barsh 1993; Goldstein 1992: 48) . While rule of law violations around the world underline the existence of a human rights problem, the creation of equivalent measures is often problematic for a number of methodological reasons. Many analysts have turned to a number of quantitative data sources to facilitate their studies. However, none of them have they stepped back and systematically taken stock of the conceptualization and operationalization of the different rule of law indices framing their analyses even though the quality of academic work presupposes accurate measurement. Accordingly, a comprehensive assessment of measures on the rule of law is, thus far, not available for the increasing number of researchers that would like to apply rule of law as a dependent or independent variable in empirical analyses.
Against this background, this paper provides a thorough comparative, critical review of seven up-to-date measures that, according to the data generators (indicated by the index naming and description) and several researchers, reflect the respect for the rule of law. The evaluation follows the different steps for the assessment of data sets suggested by Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen (2002) . Hence, the paper proceeds in four parts in which the indices' focus and scope (after a short description), conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation are evaluated -in this order.
1 As a last notification before the assessment begins, all descriptive information on the measures is found on the homepages of their providers if no other source or reference is mentioned.
Description, Focus and Scope
Seven measures fulfil the criteria set out in the introduction (see table 1 below). They are provided by five different organizations out of which most have been argued to represent a normative political bias of some sort. The first index is made available by the exclusively private operating Bertelsmann Foundation 2 (BF) based in Germany. Its rule of law measure is part of a larger transformation dataset, which is compiled to investigate the level and conditions of -and to advance -constitutional democracy combined with a socially responsible market economy. Critics 1 The structure of this paper (as well as many formulations) draws on my previous work on the measurement of civil liberty. Furthermore, it is inspired by the work of -and discussions with -Niels Bossen and Jeppe K. Sørensen. 2 http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/ have blamed the entire project to be ahistorical and Eurocentric, which implies that postcolonial countries are not assessed properly (Koelble & Lipuma, 2008) .
Like the Bertelsmann Foundation, Freedom House 3 (FH) is explicitly supporting the expansion of freedom in the world. This organization has also faced critique as it has been accused of having a right-wing bias and to overstate the level of freedom in 'US-friendly' countries (Barahona, 2007; Bollen, 1992: 205; Chomsky & Herman, 1988 Global Integrity 4 (GI) is another independent, non-profit organization placed in Washington, D.C. Its activities are financed by a diverse mix of charitable foundations, governments, multilateral institutions, and the private sector. The aim of Global Integrity is to produce information on governance and corruption trends in order to improve democratic and accountable political rule.
The Global Integrity index of rule of law and access to justice is included in an overall dataset on national-level anti-corruption mechanisms.
The only rule of law measure included in this review, which is supplied by a for-profit organization, the US-based PRS Group 5 (PRS), is the law and order index. The data constitute a fraction of the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Ratings). The PRS GROUP differs from the other data generators in that their objective is only to provide a comparative assessment of the political stability of the countries covered, not to improve governance around the world as well.
The final measure put under direct scrutiny is one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators compiled by a multi-lateral organization, 6 namely the World Bank 7 (WB). Over the years, the World Bank has faced several accusations. Among these we find support for Western interests in general and US business interest in specific as it has pushed for a neo-liberal (and neo-imperialistic) agenda (Uvin, 2002; Moore, 2007 Even though all the measures share a common focus on rule of law, they are also marked by many significant differences. One of them concerns whether the scores exclusively concern violations of rule of law committed by the government/state or if the assessments also take the overall situation in society into consideration. Both possibilities are legitimate but it depends on the research question whether which one -and therefore also which measure -is more suitable. 1996, 1998, 2000, [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] The information gathered in The restrictions on time and space variation linked to the datasets imply that their value and relevance for research questions pertaining to some specific contexts is limited. Our ability to track the development in respect for the rule of law back in time is severely restricted. Thus, for example, none of the indices cover the whole period of the third wave of democratization, not to speak of the post-WWII era, which constitute two demarcations often used in diachronic, empirical research.
Similarly, not all measures support direct comparisons to experiences of rich, long-enduring democracies (primarily OECD members) and/or small countries. On the other hand, though, the different limitations also mean a lower risk of conceptual stretching (cf. Sartori, 1970) .
Conceptualization
The next part of this review compares and assesses the attributes and attributed components that the data generators have associated with rule of law. It is dubious whether there is such a thing as the correct specification, but this does not have to mean that all definitions and specifications are equally reasonable. They can be either too maximalist or too minimalist or they can be infected by redundancy and conflation (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002: 9-13 There are good reasons to accept all the elements presented above as parts of the core concept.
The fourteen attributes appear rather overwhelming. By far, however, they do not constitute an exhaustive list of all the attributes connected to rule of law in legal and social scientific research. In general, a survey of the literature suggests an analytical distinction between three dimensions of the overarching concept, namely the functioning of the legal system, personal integrity rights, and preservation of order (Skaaning et al., 2008; . The first dimension concerns general functioning of the legal system. An independent and impartial judicial system, respect for the decisions of the courts, due process, and equality before the law constitute core attributes of this dimension. The second dimension addresses the extent to which personal integrity rights, such as freedom from arbitrary arrests, police violence, and inhuman/degrading treatment, are violated by the government. The third dimension covers features related to whether order or open conflict, violence, upheavals, and crime characterizes a country.
The conceptual overview of all the indices, shown in table 3, demonstrates the presence of convergence as well as divergence. Furthermore, we recognize many of the formal attributes presented above that make up the first dimension and among the attributes we also find some belonging to the other two dimensions. Whereas all measures consider the functioning of the legal system, GI is the single case that exclusively focuses on the first dimension. The practice of the legal system is the principal focal point of four more indices, namely BF, CC, NT, and FW, out of which the latter is the only one to address order besides personal integrity rights. PRS pays equal attention to the legal system's strength and impartiality and the public respect for law obedience.
The same observation applies to WB covering personal integrity as well. PRS tends to be spoiled by the opposite pitfall, namely excessive minimalism, as popular observance of the law is not enough to secure order (the state and foreign powers could ruin it).
PRS is generally defined in so unspecific terms and vaguely that it is very difficult to get a grip on its content. On the other hand, the simplicity of this measure's conceptualization helps to avoid conflation and redundancy.
Regarding redundancy, the measures make explicit distinctions between different levels of abstraction; WB and NT only operate with two levels, though. The other indices also make efforts to sort the attributes and attribute components accordingly, but they are not equally successful in doing so. CC provides at least three redundant attribute components. For instance, if all persons are entitled to equal protection under the law and all persons are equal before the courts and tribunals, then discrimination on the grounds of gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation in the legal system is not possible. 10 Similarly, concerning BF, if the separation of powers works it means that the judiciary is independent. As to the problem of conflation, GI offers an illustrating example when it places the rather specific attribute 'Judges are safe when adjudicating corruption cases' on the same abstraction level as (e.g.) 'The judiciary is able to act independently'. This comment ends the section on conceptualization and we now move on to the question of measurement.
Measurement
A clarification of the conceptual landscape is a prerequisite for proper measurement, that is, the operationalization of rule of law. A codebook is necessary to record and make public the rules and choices guiding the coding process to increase consistency, transparency, and replicability. As the quality of available information is often questionable and inconsistent across nations, over time, and vis-à-vis different aspects (cf. Bollen 1992: 189) , it is extra important to establish equivalence through firm guidelines.
As shown in table 3 below, all measures base their scores on a broad range of information.
Information on the condition of rule of law is calibrated into numerical values according to predetermined sets of coding standards. This kind of subjective measurement has been heavily disputed because reliability problems are likely to arise owing to random and systematic measurement errors introduced by the raters who interpret the sources differently. On the other hand, rule of law and all its key traits is very difficult to measure through objective indicators and the validity of the measures has the highest priority (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 18) . The Freedom
House measures and BF stand out for their narrative country reports that accompany their numerical assessments, while GI takes the lead when it comes to a detailed description of the circumstances, sources, and review comments that have influenced the score of each components. Thus, a comprehensive coding manual is warranted. With regard to the Freedom House measures (FW, CC, NT), the codebooks consist of little more than checklists defining the parameters of the indicators combined with mere standard descriptions of how to interpret the numerical scores assigned to the cases. 11 Furthermore, the checklists used in the data construction have undergone changes during the years meaning that the diachronic, internal consistency of the scores is questionable. The guidelines outlined in the codebooks concerning BF and GI have become increasingly detailed so they now represent good backgrounds for the coding process. In contrast, it is questionable whether an outright PRS code manual even exists. According to the generator, the scores are assigned on the basis of a series of pre-set questions for each component. However, the list of questions is not made available alongside the essay on methodology and they are, most likely, highly inadequate.
As to the use of coders, all datasets are based on the work of more than one to support the interrater reliability. Furthermore, in all cases except PRS, the scores are based on assessments made by experts rather than students, and the data are scrutinized through comprehensive review processes. Despite these positive features, though, statistical interrater reliability tests are missing.
The overall percentage of agreement (or near-agreement) was published for the dataset behind BF, but only for the 2003 assignments. In addition, this simple measure has several resembling, but more sophisticated alternatives, such as kappa and Krippendorf's alpha.
Among the guidelines found in the codebooks, we often find a presentation of the range and graduation of numerical scores to be assigned. The measurement levels of the examined measures are mostly neither theoretically justified nor attached to discussions directed towards maximizing homogeneity within classes using a minimal number of distinctions (cf. Munck & Verkuilen 2002: 17-18). Variance truncation could pose a problem concerning the attribute components of GI and PRS because of crude measurement scales. On the other hand, the more fine-grained options linked to the other measures are not unproblematic; they make it more demanding to define criteria for each point and more difficult for the coders to employ consistently.
Aggregation
When the process of assignment is concluded, researchers often combine disaggregate scores collected in the measurement process into overall indices. But this analytical step is often not founded in theoretical and empirical justification. The rule of law measures do not deviate from the trend. The generators of the original data neither base their aggregations on explicit theory about the relationship between the attributes nor do they test the empirical dimensionality of their datasets through the employment of statistical tools. 12 I have therefore carried out such tests myself, and the results (not reported) indicate that CC and BF are uni-dimensional and that GI is certainly not.
Unfortunately, the data generators of the remaining measures do not score the cases on a low level of abstraction despite a working definition that disaggregates the main concepts (NT); 13 or they do not make their lower-level data publicly available even if requested (FW, PRS). In this way, these measures only allow researchers to discriminate between countries according to their overall rule of law score without the possibility the dig a bit deeper into interesting relationships or to make use of alternative aggregation procedures. It is very interesting that -despite the missing theoretical associated with both dimensions. This finding is not surprising because it reflects the fact that all the data from the original measures are used in the construction of WB and it defined rule of law very broadly. The many differences and similarities in the conceptualization and measurement of rule of law naturally intrigue our curiosity of what happens if these measures are employed interchangeably as dependent variables. Thus, the same four indices that were included in the factor analysis are used interchangeably to represent the explanandum in a model designed to account for the variation in present-day 14 , global variation in respect for the rule of law. They are all standardized to go from 0 to 100, 100 signifying the highest rule of law level. A presentation and operationalization of the independent variables (explanans) is placed in an appendix. The results are presented in tables 6 and 7.
There is much agreement between the findings of the regressions using WB06 and PRS06.
The relationship between the rule of law and oil production as well as inequality is negative and 14 Latest year of measurement.
significant. Wealth and a Scandinavian legal origin, on the other hand, are positively related to the outcome. The similarities outweigh the differences. However, the variation in rule of law accounted for by the models is considerably higher for WB, and a socialist legal origin tends to decrease the rule of law a lot if WB represents the dependent variable. In contrast, the findings indicate no significant relationship between socialist/communist past or presence and PRS.
The theoretical links between country size and ethno-religious fractionalization on the one hand and rule of law on the other are largely disconfirmed by the empirical analysis. Country size, however, is significant in the first two regression analyses with WB06 as dependent variable. Its loss of significance in the third model could be caused by selection bias as the inequality indicator falls short of data for many small countries. Unstandardized coefficients reported with (heteroscedasticity-consistent) robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 0.1-level, **Significant at the 0.01-level, ***Significant at the 0.001-level (one-tailed test).
Concerning the results achieved through a step-wise application of FW06 and BF07, they agree that oil production is negatively and modernization positively associated with rule of law. Moreover, the results still indicate that economic inequality harms rule of law. However, Muslim countries now show significantly lower levels of rule of law. This finding was not supported by WB and PRS; it probably constitutes the most striking exception from the general impression that fairly similar patterns emerge. It is not unlikely that is the measures' different accentuation of the legal system's strength and independence vs. order in society, which plays an important role in this respect.
Notice also that both the results linked to FH06 and WB06 indicate that large countries are more likely to perform worse with regard to rule of law than smaller countries and that a socialist legal origin has the opposite effect of a Scandinavian legal origin -but they disagree on whether a
French legal origin has a noteworthy impact. Unstandardized coefficients reported with (heteroscedasticity-consistent) robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 0.1-level, **Significant at the 0.01-level, ***Significant at the 0.001-level (one-tailed test).
Conclusion
The review of the seven rule of law measures lends support to some general conclusions. First, the indices differ significantly on all the parameters that have been addressed in this paper, that is, focus and scope, conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation. The assessment also demonstrated that the differences were often not equally (im)plausible. In general, the justifications made in relation to the index constructions were inadequate, and among the particular shortcomings were considerable restrictions in the coverage of years and countries. Conceptual pitfalls in the form of redundancy and weak theoretical foundation were frequent, whereas limitations in the creation and availability of disaggregate data, insufficient codebooks, and impression in the references to sources undermined the operationalizations. Concerning the aggregation procedures, they were characterized by the default option of using unweighted averages rather than being grounded in theory and tests of empirical dimensionality. In fact, the rule of law measures tapped into at least two distinct dimensions; one of them reflecting the quality of the legal system (e.g., equality before the law and independent courts) and the other mirroring the level of order in society (e.g., absence of violence and crime). Also underlining the differences, a multiple-regression analysis showed that replacements of the rule of law measures with one another -function as the dependent variablechanged the results in significant ways.
Future research can benefit from the explications and critical points put forward in this assessment in three ways. First, the critical appraisal has provided implicit and explicit suggestions for improvement of the existing measures. Second, we can learn from the advantages and disadvantages of previous measures when we set out to construct new datasets and indices related to good governance in general and rule of law in particular. Third, the shortcomings of -and differences in -the leading measures call for re-examinations of the many studies that, in one way or another, have used them as rule of law indicators. Taken together, the findings suggest that more precaution is needed in the development and application of rule of law indicators, not that we should give up our search for better measurement tools.
Appendix A
Theoretical explanations of the rule of law and their operationalization (Skaaning et al., 2008: 8-11) Resource Curse (oil production). The extraction of natural resources such as oil and minerals is the second economic and socio-economic factor suggested to have an impact on the respect for liberaldemocratic rights (Ross, 2001; Karl, 1997) . Empirical research has shown that having natural resources generally harms a country's prospects for democratic development. Following a similar line of reasoning, it is expected that natural resource dependency tends to make countries less bound to the principles of rule of law. According to Ross (2001) , the resource curse consists of at least two possible causal mechanisms, namely a rentier effect and a repression effect. The logic of the rentier effect is that governments in oil-rich countries use their revenues from natural resources to reduce public pressures for greater state accountability. The governments can use low tax rates and greater spending on patronage to decrease public demands for broader societal development including the institution of rule of law. As regards the repression effect, the argument says that natural resource wealth is used to suppress competitive and oppositional forces. In addition, resource wealth may lead to ethnic or regional conflict over access to the 'easy money'. In the present study, the resource curse is operationalized by the use of IMF's list of hydro-carbon rich countries (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) found in the Guide on Resource Transparency. 15 These countries, with a heavy reliance on oil production for government revenues, receive the value of 1 and the rest a 0 meaning that the variable is treated as a dichotomy.
Modernization (wealth).
The modernization theory is the most notorious of the suggested explanations. The overall theoretical argument is that modernization increases the probability that regimes are liberal (democratic) (cf. Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al., 2000; Epstein et al., 2006) . As regards the theoretical mechanisms at place, the theory emphasizes changes in attitudes towards more moderation, tolerance, and acceptance of pluralism. Moreover, the strength and autonomy of the civil society increases, which help its readiness and ability to control the exercise of political power broadly understood. In the measurement of modernization, the standard wealth indicator is Country size. A country's territorial size has been argued to influence the degree of rule of law.
Gustav Hansson and Ola Olsson (2006) propose to causal links for the relationship. First, they present a direct 'broadcasting-effect' suggesting that rule of law has the character of a local public good that is imperfectly spread from the capital to the remaining territory. Second, larger countries tend to be endowed with a larger amount of primary sector rents. This circumstance means that the size indirectly brings about a 'rent seeking-effect', which feeds corrupt practices and generally biases the incentives of the elite and public officials towards 'unlawful' rule. The (natural log) of a country's total area in square kilometres is used to measure this variable based on data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Religion. The concept of rule of law was created and developed in the West and then spread around the rest of the world. Samuel P. Huntington (1996: 70, 311) 1996: 102-116, 184-185, 193, 241) . Therefore, in terms of religion, Huntington expects countries, where Islam is the dominant religion, to be negatively associated with rule of law. Among the causal mechanisms suggested to link religion and rule of law, some emphasize whether a religion is hierarchical and authoritarian or individualist and egalitarian (Treisman, 2000: 403; Hayo & Voigt, 2005: 11) . It has been argued that Islam has more propensity to penetrate all spheres of society (Hefner, 2001: 497) (Fish & Brooks, 2004: 162) . A second argument says that a negative effect is to be expected because different groupings tend to help 'their own' by corrupt means (Paldam, 2001: 388) . Moreover, it might be more difficult to coordinate and produce a coherent opposition to a repressive, rule-violating state in a divided society (Hayo & Voigt, 2005: 10; Weingast, 1997: 256) . Data on the degree of heterogeneity are taken from Alesina et al. (2003) , who have constructed scores of ethnic and religious fractionalization. The values of the indices correspond to the probability that two randomly selected people belong to different ethnic and religious groups, respectively, meaning that a high value on the index corresponds to a high degree of fractionalization in a given country (2003: 158-160) . As the same logic applies to both ethnic and religious fractionalization, a combined measure, based on the maximum value of the two original indices for each country, is employed.
The Origin of Legal Systems. La Porta et al. divide national legal traditions in the world into five legal traditions developed in England (common law), the Soviet Union (socialist law), France (French civil law), Germany (German civil law), and Scandinavia (Scandinavian civil law); the distinction between the latter three being relatively small, while rather significant between common law, socialist law, and civil law. In short, different characteristics of the legal systems are expected to account for some of the variation in rule of law. One line of thought suggests that common law systems are superior as a result of their origin. English common law, it is claimed, was developed mostly to protect the property of individuals and to limit the power of the state, whereas civil law developed more as an instrument for the state to expand its power and regulate its citizens. Among the civil law countries, however, those with German or Scandinavian legal origin are expected to perform better than those with French civil law because they have managed to build professional rather than patrimonial bureaucracies. As to socialist law, it should have a clear negative impact because it 'is a clear manifestation of the State's intent to create institutions to maintain its power and extract resources, without much regard for protecting the economic interest or the liberties of the population' (La Porta et al., 1999: 231-232) .
In addition to these differences, it is argued that due to an emphasis on process and legal precedent, the common law system allows for the development of the legal system in a more flexible manner across time and space (Joireman, 2001: 573) . Therefore, common law is expected to function better in very dissimilar contexts. Furthermore, lawyers have a stronger position within common law systems, which can provide an important alternative power to the state, thereby increasing the chances for a development of rule of law (Joireman, 2001: 575) . Concerning the operationalization of legal origin, the distinctions and data (constructed as a set of dummies)
provided by La Porta et al. are used. Common law constitutes the reference category since it typical in the literature compare the performance of legal systems with this tradition.
Inequality. Several theoretical arguments are readily available regarding why income inequality should affect the level of rule of law. First, an unequal income distribution can increase instability (Londregan & Poole, 1990 ) if low-income groups feel forced to make use of civil disobedience and violence (etc.) in order to attain socio-economic objectives. Opposing the poor, a rich elite probably feels more pressure on their position if they have much to loose and their opponents much to gain, so they initiate a high level of suppression using 'private helpers' or the state apparatus (military, police, and courts). In general, a preferential treatment of economic elites is expectable as they can use their economic resources for privileged treatment (through bribery etc.). Income inequality is operationalized using the Gini-coefficient scores from the UNDP Human Development Indicators.
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The coefficient varies theoretically between 0 (no income inequality) and 1 (one person earns all income).
17 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
